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Abstract. A new trend in pervasive personal server hosting is to en-
able the integration of a user’s social spheres. Ideally, the design of ac-
cess control to private data should be flexible and independent of the
target host. Personal data should also remain independent of environ-
mental constraints, e.g., in order to support easy migration to new de-
ployment landscapes. Such information interoperability can be achieved
by ontology-based personal information sphere representation and man-
agement. In the digital.me project, personal data is modeled using a
comprehensive set of integrated, multi-domain ontologies.This paper ad-
dresses the design and first prototype of the digital.me Userware access
control engine. Here, we introduce a two-level access control design in or-
der to decouple the semantic core from the hosting web container, while
ensuring that personal data and the associated ontology-based access
rights remain flexibly decoupled from the underlying environment.
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1 Introduction
New trends aim at integrating all personal data in a personal information sphere
(e.g., interests, contact information) by a single, user-controlled point of access.
For this, many examples could be cited such as:
– DIASPORA, a project to help people to own their social data in a decen-
tralized way [1]
– pervasive/ubiquitous solutions for end-user-hosted remote online education
(CURE1) [2, 3], support for mobile communities sensing [4, 5] or SocialTV
[6, 7]
1 Collaborative Universal Remote Education: http://cure.sourceforge.net/
– Eclipse’s Higgins project [8]
– the EU FP7 digital.me project [9] itself
All these systems foresee the usage of pervasive personal servers for reaching
their interaction goals. However and with respect to the context of this paper
Higgins and digital.me leverage ontology modeling in order to provide intelligent
management capabilities of the personal spheres [10]. From the security point of
view, digital.me supports transparent anonymity at the network level [11] and
does not target only cloud deployment as in the case of Higgins.
In general access control, namely, secure authentication and authorization as
well as ensuring the confidentiality of the communication between clients and
server is must-have. In this paper we present an approach describing details
related to the advancements in the ontology-based access control approach em-
ployed in the project. The essential requirements (functional and non-functional)
by considering technical agreements (e.g., usage of the Spring Framework2, sup-
port of HTTP and OAuth3) are listed and their fulfillment is addressed. The
presented two-layer design of the access control allows for flexible decoupling
of the ontology access control from environmental security attributes (securing
communications, RBAC4 based authentication, authorization, and secure busi-
ness logic access).
The paper is structured as follows. The next section addresses related work.
Section 3 presents the digital.me related requirements analysis. Section 4 presents
our approach and demonstrates its feasibility by providing technical details in
section 5. Finally, the paper is concluded in section 6 and future directions are
shortly mentioned.
2 Related work
An actual overview of current EU trust and privacy related projects can be found
in [3] where recent EU FP6 (PRIME project5) as well as EU FP7 projects (e.g.,
PICOS6 and PrimeLife7) are addressed. A relatively good overview of classi-
cal access control mechanisms, especially for collaborative/cooperative settings
(sharing data in workspaces) is given in [12].
With respect to ontology-based pervasive personal servers, none of contem-
porary literature, however, addresses the combination of ontology modeling in
combination with classical access control mechanisms (i.e., RBAC as described
in this document) as initially introduced in [13] and detailed here based on the
Privacy Preferences Ontologies [14]. Further we also address the inclusion of trust
in those new mechanisms and thus present a contribution beyond the state-of
the art.
2 http://www.springsource.org/
3 http://oauth.net/
4 Role Based Access Control
5 https://www.prime-project.eu/
6 http://www.picos-project.eu/
7 http://www.primelife.eu/
3 Problem and requirements analysis
The digital.me project aims at integrating all personal data in a personal infor-
mation sphere by a single, user-controlled point of access: the digital.me User-
ware (s. Fig. 1). This tool shall be a user-controlled personal service providing
intelligent personal information management and is targeted on integrating so-
cial web systems and communities. It realizes a decentralized communication to
avoid external data storage and undesired data disclosure.
Fig. 1. Digital.me communication flows and involved parties
3.1 Role in the digital.me system architecture
In summary, the role of the Access Control Engine also by considering relation-
ship to other components, especially the Trust Engine is highlighted in Fig. 2.
The developed trust metric is being used for access control decisions. Therefore
we have identified two main points of usage. First it helps the user giving access
rights to the data under his/her control by providing privacy recommendations.
Then, after a while of usage of the digital.me Userware, when the trust engine
learned enough about the user to provide accurate trust values (or after the
user might have set them manually), the user is able to define special rules to
automatically share specific data to trusted contacts. Both of this access rules
are defined with the help of a special ontology, the Privacy Preference Ontology
(s. 4.3).
The numbered arrows (1, 2, and 3) highlight the principle flows taken place
and involving directly or indirectly the Access Control Engine. Since the request
broker forwards incoming calls either to the Trust Engine (step 1a) or to the
Access Control Engine (step 1b). In both cases, the Access Control Engine is
involved since the Trust Engine involves indirectly (step 2). The business logic
is than carried out by involving the digital.me controllers layer hosting as well
as storage layer (step 3 for persisting roles, permissions, roles and further access
control data incl. those managed with the help of the ontology model). The
Fig. 2. Overall access control engine interdependencies
opposite direction is also supported which means that access control decisions
could include the Trust Engine as described in Deliverable D4.018.
The objectives of the Access Control Engine target to:
– model Trust, Privacy and Security
– perform decisions based on ontology modeling
– enforce secure authentication and authorization
– ensure filtering Personal Information shared with 3rd parties
– enable User Controlled Data Sharing
– support On-the-go user -defined and customized privacy settings, by consid-
ering trust in involved networks, etc.
– take external (e.g., organizational) privacy policies into consideration
– drive the Privacy Advisory/Recommendations (warnings to user)
8 http://dime-project.eu/publications/Items/ItemDetail.aspx?ID=4498
– return results of access decisions to the UI for considering usability issues
3.2 Gathered requirements and technical decisions
Based on relevant literature for access control and in the context of ongoing
tasks in digital.me, the consortium partners agreed on supporting the following
requirements:
– securing communication among involved components in the digital.me envi-
ronment (Client to Server, Server to Server, and Server to External Services
with different trust levels) (R1)
– securing the digital.me Web Layer (incl. references to any needed resource)
(R2)
– securing the access to the digital.me Business Logic (incl. access to the on-
tology model) (R3)
– supporting security event logging if needed (OPT R4)
Technical decision are related to the following and could be found in the
technical specification of the digital.me infrastructure9:
– supporting HTTP as main communication protocol and supporting Restful
web services in the first phase10
– using Spring framework as underlying development framework
– using ORM Technologies for accessing various storage technologies11
– using OAuth (along with Restful web services) as authorization protocol for
specific scenarios (e.g., interaction with external services)12
The most important non-functional requirements (NFRs) are:
– flexible integration the ontology model access control facilities (NFR1)
– considering Trust and Privacy in the (meta) modelling of the ontology model
(NFR2)
One additional NFR, which is related to architectural concerns targets lever-
aging advantages of aspect-orientated programming (AOP) for crosscutting con-
cerns like security for simplifying the architecture and code maintenance (NFR3)
[15–18]. Thereby fulfilling mainly NFR1. By using the Spring framework, AOP
support is ensured (fulfilling so NFR3). Another important NFR is to sup-
port future authentication schemes by introducing an abstract authentication
layer allowing for easy switching or parallel chaining of different authentication
schemes (NFR4). The last important NFR is related to the secure data storage
and migration of the data hosted in the PS (NFR5).
9 http://dime-project.eu/publications/Items/ItemDetail.aspx?ID=4501
10 XMPP remain a candidate for future extensions
11 Hibernate and JPA in combination with relational databases such as MySQL
12 Only client functionality is supported for now. Two external services where included,
namely, LinkedIn and Twitter
4 Approach
4.1 Digital.me access control overview
Fig. 3. Digital.me Access Control Layers (1st and 2nd level)
Digital.me access control is designed as two-level layer, which fulfills NFR1:
– Environmental Access Control Layer called 1st level layer, and
– Ontology-based Access Control Layer (2nd level layer).
Such separation between the environmental related access control attributes and
those one stored and managed by the ontology model (2nd level layer) allows
for:
– solving the problem of securing the access to the ontology model itself, which
can therefore not be used for the access to the environment hosting it.
– keeping the digital.me ontology model independent from environmental at-
tributes (in this case those ones related to the web container hosting the
Userware software) and leveraging so the potential future hosting in other
environments.
Fig. 4. Spring Security Supported Authorization Styles (from [19])
In our web oriented current implementation, Figure 3 depicts the resulting
access control (AC) layers. While the 1st level layer is related to the Web layer,
the 2nd level layer is connected with the semantic model. Both layers need ac-
cess to low level resources hosted on the underlying operating system (OS) such
as files or any other resource that have to be persisted, referenced or used in
digital.me. For this, both layer communicate with each other by means of an
Access Decision Manager (R2). That component has in our case to be imple-
mented separately since the Spring Framework does not support in an adequate
manner until now as presented in the following table provided by Wheeler et
al. in [19]. Wheelers book provides many practical recipes for classical security
topics related to authentication, authorization as well as session management,
secure business logic access and security oriented logging (R1-3 and OPT R4).
For implementing the Personal Server (PS) security, trust and privacy function-
alities, many of these recipes (s. Fig. 4) were adopted/adapted as we describe in
the following (sub-)sections .
An Access Control interceptor is enabled at the level of the PS and is involved
by any incoming call to it. This interceptor resides at the level of the single-entry-
point of the whole digital.me environment (NFR3).
4.2 Environmental access control: 1st Level authentication and
authorization
The 1st level Access Control Layer addresses the following points:
– securing the digital.me communications layer incl. external services (securing
the web container communication means13 and 4.2/5.2 for external services).
(R1)
– securing di.me Web Layer and allowing for multiple authentication provider
at the same time by using AuthenticaionVoter15 . (R2)
– allowing for RBAC based authorization in the 1st level layer by using self
implemented RBAC functionality, which could be combined with Spring Ab-
stractAclVoter16 classes. An example is depicted for our current implemen-
tation in Figure 4. (R1-2)
13 The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL14) protocol and its successor, Transport Layer Se-
curity (TLS), are used to provide transport level security for HTTP transactions
over the webthese are known as HTTP Secure (HTTPS) transactions. Hashing and
salting passwords describe enabled additions.
15 In Wheelers book Spring Access Control lists are explained in various recipes
for empowering different authentication schemes by voting involving differ-
ent AuthenticationProvider. Some AuthenticationProvider are provided by the
Spring Security framework: AnonymousAuthenticationProvider, CasAuthentication-
Provider, DaoAuthenticationProvider, JaasAuthenticationProvider, LdapAuthen-
ticationProvider, OpenIDAuthenticationProvider, RemoteAuthenticationProvider,
PreAuthenticatedAuthenticationProvider.
16 In Wheelers book Spring Access Control Lists and Voters are explained in various
recipes for empowering access control.
– securing Business Logic and Ontology Model by using JSR-250 annotations
in code17 with combination of the RBAC configuration implemented. (R3)
Fig. 5. RBAC 1st level implementation for digital.me according to a Wheelers recipe
(from [19]).
Adding adapters for wrapping authentication and authorization through the
ontology based model is the connection point between the both levels as we show
here concretely with the help of the file upload scenario (involving the semantic
crawler, PSresourceController, the AccessDecisionController and FileManager as
well as the Access Control Repository18 ).
Fig. 6. Sequence diagram for a typical flow taking place when involving all layers with
respect to resources usage (e.g., Files).
17 @PreAuthorize annotation defines a default denyAll rule for the methods in the class
and override later with @PreAuthorize(”hasRole(’PERM READ FORUMS’)”).
18 Adding adapters for wrapping authentication and authorization through the ontol-
ogy based model is the connection point between the both levels as we show here
concretely with the help of the file upload scenario (involving the semantic crawler,
PSresourceController, the AccessDecisionController and FileManager as well as the
Access Control Repository).
A similar sequence diagram emerges when the OAuthController is accessing
an external services by using access tokens. In that case the attributes depicted
in the following ER diagram shows the tables structure of the used entities for
supporting the management of digital.me multiple service-accounts (e.g., various
LinkedIn accounts of the same user).
Fig. 7. ER diagram for the service-account relationship managing external services
tokens.
The fulfillment of NFR4 along with NFR3 (enabling architectural support
for R1-3 and OPT R4) is automatically reached by using Spring Security as
shown in Fig. 8.
Fig. 8. Abstract Authentication Manager (left) and Authentication Provider (right)
(from [19]).
In summary, the realization of the current RBAC implementation includes
the following steps:
– segmentation of users of the system into user classes
– assigning levels of authorization to user roles : The first step is the mapping
of an authenticated principal to one or more authorities (often called roles).
– assigning user roles to user classes (Authorities class)
– applying authentication rules globally across application resources: The sec-
ond step is the assignment of authority checks to secured resources of the sys-
tem (AccessDecisionManager and ontology access control facilities involve-
ment).
– applying authorization rules at all levels of the application architecture (Se-
curing the business logic by considering RBAC design).
– preventing common types of attacks intended to manipulate or steal a user’s
session (SSL, Hashing and session management facilities provided by Spring).
4.3 Domain model access control: Ontology-based authorization
(2nd Level) (NFR2)
In digital.me, different kinds of information in the integrated personal informa-
tion sphere are subject to different access rights, as defined and controlled by
the user. This means that different subsets of this integrated information should
be made available to different types of agents, be they other users or service ac-
counts. To address this requirement, we pursue an ontology-based approach to
flexible authorization system, which enables the users authorization preferences
to be stored adequately and separately to the information resources to which
they provide or restrict access. Thus, personal information is not replicated into
multiple subsets, each of which is targeted at different agents. Instead, multiple
access right preferences are stored as metadata alongside the unique personal in-
formation representations. To achieve this ontology-based authorization system,
we adopt the Privacy Preference Ontology (PPO), introduced next, in digital.me.
The PPO [14] is a lightweight vocabulary that was originally intended to en-
able users to create fine-grained privacy preferences for their data. In digital.me,
it is useful for the same purpose, albeit with a few restrictions in regards to its
use. The PPO was designed with an Open World view to personal information
in mind, where unless specified otherwise, all personal information is assumed
to be accessible by everyone. This approach is aligned with the original domain
for which the PPO was designed i.e. the Web Linked Open Data (LOD) cloud.
Within digital.me, the required approach is for a closed worldview to personal in-
formation, i.e., all such information is inaccessible, unless the contrary is stated.
Thus, whereby in the LOD the PPO was meant to to restrict any resource to
certain attributes, which a requester must satisfy, within digital.me it is meant
to give access to resources represented in the personal information sphere.
Figure 9 demonstrates the adoption of the PPO within the digital.me On-
tology Framework (refer to Deliverable 03.0119). In fact, the PPO is only one of
an integrated set of independent ontologies covering a wide variety of domains
relating to the user’s personal information. This ranges from less abstract infor-
mation such as different kinds of native resources present on the user’s devices
and online accounts, user presence derived from device sensors and activities,
to higher-level representations of user annotations and resource relationships in
19 http://dime-project.eu/publications/Items/ItemDetail.aspx?ID=4496
Fig. 9. Reusing the PPO in digital.me.
user’s mental model of the personal information itself. The ontology framework
adopts and extends established standards20, including the entire set of ontologies
used for the Social Semantic Desktop [20].
The use of the PPO relies on two other ontologies in the framework, the
Personal Information Model Ontology PIMO (shown in the figure) and the
Nepomuk Sharing Ontology NSO. As a special instance of a PIMO Agent, the
user can define multiple privacy preferences (through nso:hasPrivacyPreference
in the extended Nepomuk Sharing Ontology), each of which identifies a ref-
erence to an informational resource that can be shared with a specific set of
agents (ppo:AccessSpace). The access space can be defined through two new
NSO properties nso:includes and nso:excludes. These can be mapped to the UI
level, whereby the user can provide both access whitelists and blacklist to easily
determine who should be given access to a resource. The privacy preference grant
access to specific resources, or to all instances of a specific class having specific
conditions. The first option is more fine-grained, and states exactly which piece
of information (e.g. the users first name, personal email address, file) is being
made accessible. The second option is more generic, and can be used in cases
where all instances of a class (e.g. all resources of type pimo:Document that are
related to a project) can always be shared with the same set of agents.
Two additional properties in the NSO ontologies mark which resources have
actually been shared with other agents. This is to be differed from the PPO
representations, since the latter define with whom resources can be shared, rather
than with whom they have already been shared. Also shown in Figure 9 is a
subset of the Nepomuk Annotation Ontology NAO, which in the context of
the digital.me project has been extended to support the automatic/manually-
adjusted specification of trust values for a user’s contacts and groups, as well as
privacy levels for a user’s resources.
20 For more information please refer to di.me deliverable D03.01
5 Selected technical details
We based on Spring technologies for implementing AC functionalities along with
classes from the ontology framework used. Spring security21 provides a sophis-
ticated authentication and access control system and became widely adopted as
the standard solution for securing Spring Framework based applications used
in critical applications [21]. Spring Security 3 provides a bundle of resources
that allow for many common security practices to be declared or configured in
a straightforward manner[22].
According to various technical literature, standards such as Java Authentica-
tion and Authorization Service (JAAS22) or Java EE Security do offer some ways
of performing some of the same authentication and authorization functions, but
the Spring Security module packages up implementations in a concise way and
offers powerful baseline configuration features available out of the box, e.g., for
various security topics such as authentication and authorization. Furthermore,
a big community (also from the industry23) is continuously contributing and
improving this framework to cover new security topics and fix detected issues
[22]. Furthermore, the fulfillment of our requirements R1-R3, OPT R4, and
NFR1-NFR4 are efficiently supported in terms of development costs.
Even though Spring Security’s, application specific implementation concerns,
architecture limitations, and infrastructure integration requirements are likely to
complicate implementations also in the case of using Spring Security. However,
Spring Security is a ”hands-on” framework where developer are able to customize
or extend the code to fulfill requirements that go beyond the basic out of the
box options [22].
We used two libraries for integrating/supporting OAuth at the level of the
PS:
– Spring Social24 (initial implementation)
– Scribe25 (current implementation)
Although all candidates considered for the retrieval of data from the external
services supported OAuth, the Scribe Library was preferred for various reasons.
In comparison to other candidate libraries such as OpenSocial , its advantages
are that it is able to retrieve raw data (XML, JSON26, etc.), it supports the ma-
jority of the popular social networks, and, from an architectural point of view, is
21 http://static.springsource.org/spring-security/site/
22 http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/javase/jaas/index.html
23 Spring was recently acquired (for 420 million dollars,
http://www.readwriteweb.com/enterprise/2009/08/vmware-acquires-springsource-
for-420-million.php) by VMware Inc., the leading company for virtualization
technologies. With this, the deployment of a Spring based PS into the cloud us
assured since VMware is part of the Cloud Alliance targeting inter-operability.
24 http://www.springsource.org/spring-social
25 https://github.com/fernandezpablo85/scribe-java
26 http://www.json.org/
more decoupled than for example OpenSocial. However, an advantage of the lat-
ter candidate library was that it introduced an abstract interface to the different
external services APIs and supported the persistence of the used access tokens
and secrets. Therefore, since Scribe does not include persistence, this function-
ality had to be coded separately and integrated in the DecisionAccessManager.
The current PS implementation includes an OAuth controller at the level of
the digital.me communications package. The supported interaction flow is shown
in the following sequence diagram depicted in Figure 8.
Fig. 10. Agreed flow for OAuth external services based communication.
The sequence diagram show how the PS checks if there were valid credentials
acquired before in a previous interaction with a given external services provider
(here LinkedIn in our current implementation). The access tokens are then either
stored for the first time for future use or used if existing. In the case they were
invalidated (according to the OAuth invocation procedure), the OAuth controller
ensures their update in the storage. For the moment, the PS has access to two
external services, namely, LinkedIn and Twitter, both by using OAuth 1.0A27.
27 OAuth 1.0A addresses the session fixation attack in OAuth 1.0. However, the digi-
tal.me project is targeting supporting OAuth 2.0 Authorization Protocol, which is
more easy to use but still a draft and therefore not supported by many providers.
The OAuth protocol enables third-party applications to obtain limited access
to an HTTP service on behalf of the resource owner. This access is established
by orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource owner and the
HTTP service. It is also possible to allow a third-party to obtain access to an
HTTP service on its own behalf. In the traditional model, the resource owner
shares its credentials with a third party, which leads to several problems and
limitations:
– for future use, the third-party is not able to save the resource owner’s cre-
dentials a hashed form. The credential has to be saved in clear text, which
leads to the problem, that after one third-party is compromised the resource
owner password is compromised, too.
– the third-party gains full access to the resources. The resource owner has no
ability to restrict the access to a limited subset or to restrict the duration of
the access.
– revoking the access of one third-party means to revoke the access of all
others, because the only possibility the resource owner has, is to change his
password.
– it is hard for the user to keep an overview over all third parties he has granted
access to his resources.
OAuth uses a new layer of authorization to address these issues. The new
layer separates the role of the resource consumer from the role of the resource
owner. The resource consumer is issued a different set of credentials than those
of the resource owner. This new credential, called the Access Token, indicates
access attributes like the scope or the lifetime of the access, and is the only
secret a third-party needs to access the users protected resources. Because every
third-party has to request a different Access Token, it is easy for the user to
maintain a list of entities consuming his resources and revoke access on/at the
smallest possible level.
With OAuth, the digital.me Access Control Engine (Authentication Layer)
will be able to distinguish among different devices as well as applications (e.g.,
web browser) of the same user without collecting privacy sensitive data about
these devices. This is due to the fact that OAuth authorizes separately the
access to each application (running on also on different devices of the same user).
However, an extension for specific scenarios needing to distinguish between those
devices remain possible and has to be analyzed from the privacy point of view
for the intended scenarios.
6 Conclusions and future work
This paper provided presented the two-layer/-level design of the Access Control
Engine in the digital.me project. The gathered functional and non-functional
requirements were listed. The approach concretely fulfills gathered requirements
with two layers which separates between the environmental related access con-
trol attributes (1st layer) and those one stored and managed by the ontology
model (2nd layer). The main advantage of keeping the digital.me ontology model
independent from environmental attributes is easing potential future migration
to other environments as well as excluding the risk of non-intentional sharing
of access control data (i.e., used credentials). The contribution represents an
added value when considering related work for ontology based pervasive per-
sonal servers. The technical solution is based on cutting-edge technologies such
Spring Security for implementing authentication and authorization along with
the ontology based access rights for our target scenarios in digital.me.
With respect to further security related concerns, future works go towards
design and implementation as well as the integration of anonymous credential
systems such as Idemix by considering usability and trust advisory for identity
management in general [23, 24] as well as fulfilling NFR5.
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